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The Changing
Bankruptcy Process
By HoNORABLE JOE LEE*
The bankruptcy process has undergone dramatic change in
the 1970's. December 18, 1970 was the effective date of the new
dischargeability law' which conferred jurisdiction upon the bank-
ruptcy courts to determine the dischargeability of particular
debts. On April 24, 1978, the Supreme Court promulgated new
rules of bankruptcy procedure for straight bankruptcy and Chap-
ter XIII cases.2 These rules, after approval by Congress, became
effective October 1, 197V. Rules governing practice under other
debtor relief chapters of the Act are in the pipeline awaiting
approval,4 and there is presently pending in Congress an omnibus
bankruptcy bill entitled The Bankruptcy Act of 1978," which, if
enacted into law, would effect sweeping changes in the structure
of the bankruptcy system, as well as in the substantive law of
bankruptcy.
These developments will have a great impact on the law of
bankruptcy. In fact, the new dischargeability law has already
considerably enhanced the power of the bankruptcy court to
enforce an order of discharge granted individual debtors. The
new rules of bankruptcy procedure have upgraded practice in
bankruptcy courts by bringing it more into conformity with prac-
tice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Likewise, as
will soon be seen, the new dischargeability law has had a tre-
mendous effect upon bankruptcy proceedings.
* Bankruptcy Judge, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky- Presi-
dent, National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges; Member, National Bankruptcy
Conference; Case Comment Editor, American Bankruptcy Law Journal; Adjunct
Instructor, University of Kentucky, College of Law; 1955 graduate of University of
Kentucky, College of Law.
I Bankruptcy-Discharge of Debts, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990 (codified
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
2 411 U.S. 989-1216 (1973).3 BANxRupTcy RurLEs ArqD OmcrL. FoRMs (U.S.C.A. 1973).
4 The Supreme Court on March 28, 1974, transmitted, to Congress, rules gov-
erning practice and procedure under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. These
rules became effective Tuly 1, 1974.5 H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess, (1973); S. 2565, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
(1973).
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One of the primary purposes of bankruptcy proceedings is to
grant relief to honest debtors. If the discharge decree is easily
circumvented, the effectiveness and very stature of the bank-
ruptcy court is called into question. Prior to enactment of the
new dischargeability law, several investigations had focused at-
tention upon the inadequacy of the discharge in bankruptcy in
providing relief for oppressed debtors.7  The objective of this
new legislation is to make more effective the discharge in bank-
ruptcy granted to individual debtors.
The dischargeability law empowers the bankruptcy court to
determine the dischargeability or nondischargeability of particular
debts, upon application of any party in interest, after notice and
hearing.8 The former rule provided that the bankruptcy court
merely determined whether a discharge should be granted, while
the effect of the discharge on a particular debt was to be adjudi-
cated by the court in which the claim was sought to be enforced
following bankruptcy.9 In theory the old rule provided for an
excellent division of labor between federal and state courts, but
in practice it did not function well for bankrupts who often
found themselves in an exceedingly hostile legal environment
following bankruptcy.10 The discharge constituted an aff rmative
defense which was waived if not properly pleaded." Bankrupts
often lost the full protection of the law through failure to plead
their discharge, or simply because they were not financially able
to retain counsel to defend post-bankruptcy actions brought
against them by creditors in the state courts.
The problem is succinctly noted in the following excerpt from
the dissenting opinion of Justice Paul in Helms v. Holmes:
The average bankrupt is a layman who has been advised that
a discharge in bankruptcy releases him from his debts and
6 Herzog, Bankruptcy Law-Modern Trends, 36 REF.J. 87, 90 (1962).
7 Hearings on S. 578 and Other Bills Before a SpecialSenate Subcomm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Joint investigation by office of United
States Attorney and Federal Bureau of Investigation at Nashville, Tenn., released
May 12, 1967.8 Bankruptcy Act §§ 2a(12), 14 and 17, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ lla(12), 32 and 35
(Supp. 1974).
9 Coleman, A Plea for "One Stop Service in Bankruptcy, 25 BIFX. J. 31
(1957).
10 Hearings on S. 578 and Other Bills, supra note 7, at 35,
"1 See, e.g., FEu. R. Civ. P. 8(c) & 12(h).
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who has faith in the dignity, the force and effect of a decree
of a federal court. He has surrendered his property and has
no means to defend himself against further litigation. It has
become a custom of greedy creditors to take advantage of this
situation by ignoring the bankruptcy proceedings and the
order of discharge and suing on their debts in the state courts
hoping that the bankrupt, because of this ignorance and faith
in this order of discharge or because he is unable to employ
counsel, will fail to appear and plead the discharge or other-
wise defend. And unfortunately this frequently happens.
Usually these suits are brought before inferior state courts,
such as justices of the peace, many of whom are laymen; and
even when the bankrupt appears and pleads his discharge
these justices, without legal training or experience in the
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act, undertake to pass upon
the effect of this discharge as affecting the particular debts-
usually reaching erroneous conclusions and usually adverse
to the bankrupt. Every court which deals with any consider-
able number of bankruptcy cases is familiar with the difficul-
ties which bankrupts have in protecting themselves from
rapacious creditors even after discharge.' 2
Hopefully the dischargeability law will correct abuses of the
discharge process such as those described above.
Prior to its enactment, the dischargeability law had been
pending before Congress in one form or another, for approxi-
mately fifteen years.13 As early as 1956 and 1957, bills were
introduced to amend Section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act to confer
jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy court to determine the discharge-
ability of particular debts, and to authorize the court to reopen
cases for the purpose of making such a determination without
additional cost to the bankrupt.14 The proposed grant of juris-
diction to enable the court to determine the dischargeability of
particular debts was combined with amendments to section
14c(8) of the Act providing for elimination of the false financial
statement as a ground for denial of a discharge in bankruptcy. 5
The 1960 amendment to Section 14c(8) of the Act (the so-
12129 F.2d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 194j
Is Hearings on S. 578 and Other Bils, supra note 7, at 24.
14H.R. 11543, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. 106, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.(1957).
'5 Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 Am. Bam-. LJ. 1, 18(1971).
1974]
KENTuciy LAw JouiWAL
called Celler amendment),16 which by way of compromise re-
tained the false financial statement as a bar to the discharge of a
debtor engaged in business while eliminating it as a ground for ob-
jecting to the discharge of a non-business bankrupt, was the fore-
runner of the dischargeability law as finally enacted by Congress in
1970. In its original form the Celler amendment would have granted
to the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to determine the discharge-
ability or nondischargeability of particular debts. However, the
provision authorizing the bankruptcy courts to make discharge-
ability determinations encountered substantial opposition in the
Senate and was dropped from the bill. 8
The Celler amendment, without the proviso empowering the
bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of debts,
did not bring about any substantial change in practice. The
small loan companies had already adopted the practice in con-
sumer bankruptcy cases of foregoing general objections to dis-
charge of the bankrupt for alleged publication of a false financial
statement. Instead, they preferred to exercise the right, which
survived bankruptcy, to sue on the debt in the state court and
thereby seek to have the debt declared nondischargeable under
the fraud exception to discharge in Section 17a(2) of the Act. 9
The latter option was not materially affected by the Celler amend-
ment. The knowledgeable creditors perceived that the law oper-
ated to their advantage when the bankrupt received a discharge
from his debts generally because the bankrupt was then more
capable of paying debts from which he was not released in the
event it should be determined in a state court action that a debt
was unaffected by the discharge. Consequently, in the era follow-
ing enactment of the Celler Amendment, as formerly, most of
the dischargeability determinations were made by the state
courts which were ill-equipped and little inclined to deal with
the problem. 0 Contrary to the congressional intent, the Celler
amendment further emasculated the effectiveness of the bank-
16 Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-621, 74 Stat. 408, as amended 11
U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
17 Hearings on May 21-22, 1958 and June 18, 1958 Before a Senate Subcomm.
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1958).
18 Id.
1911 U.S.C.A. § 35a(2) (Supp. 1974).20 Lee, What Shall We Do for the Consumer Bankrupt?, 44 REF. J. 9, 10(1970).
[Vol. 62.
BANKRupT c PRocEss
ruptcy court in protecting the debtor following the issuance of the
discharge in bankruptcy.
Section 17a of the Act,2" as newly revised by the discharge-
ability law, contains eight separate subsections or clauses cata-
loging the exceptions to the general rule that all provable debts
are released by the discharge in bankruptcy. Some rearrange-
ment of Section 17a was necessary, as part of the dischargeability
law, in order to isolate the grounds most frequently invoked for
excepting claims from discharge, over which the bankruptcy
court has been given exclusive jurisdiction, from those over which
the bankruptcy court and the state courts have concurrent juris-
diction in determining the dischargeability of debts.2 2 The ex-
ceptions which are treated differently and with respect to which
the bankruptcy court has been granted exclusive jurisdiction to
make dischargeability determinations are the so-called (2), (4),
and (8) clauses. Specifically, these clauses pertain to: § 17a(2)-
liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or
false representations or by the publication of a false financial
statement, or for wilful and malicious conversion of property of
another; § 17a(4)-liabilities for fraud, embezzlement, misap-
propriation or defalcation by the bankrupt while acting as an
officer or in any fiduciary capacity; and § 17a(8)-liabilities for
wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another
other than conversion.23 These exceptions are available only if
the creditor files a timely complaint with the bankruptcy court
for a determination of the dischargeability of a debt.24 The
creditor who fails to make timely application to the bankruptcy
court is thereafter foreclosed from invoking these provisions as
grounds for excepting his claim from the discharge. 25 The new
law requires that the bankruptcy court fix the time within which
such applications must be filed with the court, which time may
not be less than thirty days nor more than ninety days from the
date first set for the initial meeting of creditors.26 Moreover, a
creditor who fies a complaint with the bankruptcy court alleging
21 1 U.S.C.A. § 35a (Supp. 1974).22 Countryman, supra note 15, at 24-25.
23 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 35a(2), (4) & (8) (Supp. 1974).24 Bankruptcy Act § 17c(2), 11 U.S.C.A. §35c(2) (Supp. 1974).
251d.
26 Id. § 146(1), 11 U.S.C.A. § 32b(1) (Supp. 1974).
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his debt is nondischargeable on one of these grounds has the
burden of proving all the essential elements of his case.
Under the new law the creditor who claims that his debt is
nondischargeable on one of the three grounds over which the--
bankruptcy court has been given exclusive jurisdiction is no
longer at liberty to ignore the bankruptcy proceedings and sue
on the debt in the state court. The Act provides that any judg-
ment of any court other than the bankruptcy court is null and
void as determination of the personal liability of the bankrupt:
with respect to debts from which the bankrupt has been released
by reason of the failure of the creditor to seasonably seek a ruling
on the question of dischargeability from the bankruptcy court. 8
The new dischargeability law confers concurrent jurisdiction
upon the bankruptcy court and the state courts to determine the
dischargeability of debts which are not released from discharge
under the remaining five clauses of Section 17a of the Act. How-
ever, the creditor who sues the bankrupt in the state court con-
tending his debt is not discharged under clauses (1), (8), (5), (6), or
(7) of Section 17a of the Act (taxes enjoying priority, an un-
scheduled claim, wages enjoying priority, bond monies deposited
by employee, or alimony or maintenance), faces the prospect
of having the case removed to the bankruptcy court. The Act
permits the bankrupt at any time to file an application with the
bankruptcy court for a determination of the dischargeability of
any debt,20 and further provides that a bankrupt may have his
case reopened for this purpose without payment of an additional
filing feeY° Upon the filing of such an application, the com-
mencement or continuation of a suit in the state court for the
collection of the debt may be enjoined.31 The practical effect of
the new dischargeability law is to shift the arena for trying the
question of dischargeability of debts from the state court to the
bankruptcy court.
Finally, a creditor seeking a determination of the question of
the dischargeability of a debt in the bankruptcy court should also
seek judgment for the amount of the debt because the law pro-
27 Sweet v. Bitter Finance Co., 263 F. Supp. 504, 543 (S.D. Va. 1967);28 Bankruptcy Act.§ 14f, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32f (Supp. 1974).
29 Id. § 17c(1), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35c(1) (Supp. 1974).
30Id. § 17c(6), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35c(6) (Supp. 1974).
slid. § 17c(4), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35c(4) (Supp. 1974).
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vides that, where the court determines the debt to be nondis-
chargeable, it may render judgment for the amount of the debt.32
When docketed in the U.S. District Court Clerk's office the judg-
ment is collectible by execution issuing out of U.S. District Court.3
This new practice obviates the problem of split jurisdiction
which was one of the major objections to the dischargeability
provisions of the Celler Amendment under which, after the bank-
ruptcy court determined the debt to be nondischargeable, suit
to enforce collection of the debt was to be brought in state court.
Thus, under the new law, the bankruptcy court is a full service
court on the question of dischargeability.
TbE NEw BANKRuPTCY RuLEs
The new bankruptcy rules are the product of the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, created pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Judicial Code34 which directs the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States to carry on a continuous study of
the operation and effect of the rules of practice and procedure
adopted by the Supreme Court for the lower federal courts.
When the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules was first
established in 1960, its work was hampered by former Section 30
of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 which authorized the Supreme Court
to prescribe rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of the Act. However, the rules so promulgated had to be con-
sistent with the provisions of the Act, and procedural changes
were not authorized. The Committee soon recognized the de-
sirability of providing the Supreme Court with the same general
rule-making power in bankruptcy that it already had in civil,
criminal, and admiralty practice. Accordingly, the Committee
sought and obtained enactment of legislation repealing Section
30 of the Act and authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe
by general rules the forms of process, writ, pleadings, motions,
and the practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act; the
legislation provided that all laws in conflict with such rules would
thereafter be of no further force and effect.8 The bankruptcy
32 Id. § 17c(3), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35c(4) (Supp. 1974).
33 BANiRt UcY RULES 921 [hereinafter cited as RULEs].34 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
35 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 30, 30 Stat. 554 (repealed 1964).
36 The rule-making power in bankruptcy -was transferred by this legislation to
title 28 of the United States Code by the addition of a new section 2075.
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KENTUcKY LAw JouRNAL
rule-making power conferred upon the Supreme Court by this
legislation, which became effective October 3, 1964, is sub-
stantially identical to the rule-making authority delegated to the
court in other areas of practice in the federal courts.
This new dispensation of power to the Supreme Court required
a complete reorientation of the Committee's work. Freed from
the inhibiting effect of former Section 30, the Committee com-
menced the task of formulating a modem code of practice and
procedure in bankruptcy to supersede the frequently archaic and
outmoded procedures prescribed by the Act itself-most of which
date back to the basic Act of 1898, and had not been the subject
of reconsideration since the enactment of the Chandler Act in
1938.37 Although confronted by a task of stupendous propor-
tions, the Committee has achieved a comprehensive and long
overdue improvement in bankruptcy practice.
The enabling act provides that the rules adopted by the Su-
preme Court "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any sub-
stantive right." 8 The Committee found, however, that it is far
from clear where the process of improving procedure does begin
to abridge, enlarge, and modify substantive rights, especially
in the bankruptcy field where major substantive rights are so
intimately bound up in procedure 9 In drawing lines
... between substance and procedure and between procedure
and jurisdiction, and between what is appropriately left to the
political process and what is properly governed by rules,
[there is often] an assumption that the rule-making authority
should not change what is important or touch what is con-
troversial. The committee accepted no such self-abnegating
of its responsibility .... 40
The procedure whereby new bankruptcy rules are promulgated
and ultimately become effective is somewhat involved. The Ad-
visory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules reports to the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which in turn
reports to the Judicial Conference of the United States. If the
S7 Gignoux, "A Progress Report on the New Bankruptcy Rules, 44 REF. J. 13(1970).3828 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970).
39 Gignoux, supra note 87, at 15.40Kennedy, The Proposed Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms, 46 Am
BAKR. L.J. 53,58 (1972).
[Vol. 62
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Judicial Conference recommends promulgation of the rules, the
Supreme Court may enter an order fixing the effective date of the
rules and ordering that they be transmitted to Congress before
the first day of May in the year in which they are to become
effective. If Congress does not act adversely thereon, the rules
become effective 90 days after transmittal to Congress, or on such
later date as may be fixed by the court.41 Thus far, only the rules
governing practice in straight bankruptcy cases and Chapter XIII
proceedings have been utilized extensively. By order of the Su-
preme Court dated April 24, 1973 these rules were transmitted to
Congress and became effective October 1, 1973.42 The Chapter XI
rules were transmitted to Congress by the Supreme Court on
March 18,1974 and became effective July 1, 1974.4s The rules and
forms governing practice under Chapters IX, X, and XII of the
Bankruptcy Act and in railroad reorganization cases are still in
transit awaiting approval. The rules governing practice under
these debtor relief chapters are expected to become effective
in later years.
Some salient features of the new rules and forms are: (1) a
simplification of the schedules and statement of affairs,4" (2) an
automatic stay of most actions to enforce claims against the bank-
rupt or to enforce liens upon property of the estate,45 and (3) the
wholesale adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gov-
erning discovery. 6 In addition, the new rules conform pleadings
in bankruptcy cases to those under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The rules governing practice and procedure in straight bank-
ruptcy cases are divided into nine parts. Part I specifies the con-
tents of the three permissible types of petitions-voluntary, in-
voluntary, and partnership-and governs matters relating to
adjudication. Part II prescribes the procedure for the selection
of receivers, trustees, and the employment of attorneys and ac-
countants to assist the trustee in the administration of the estate.
Part III governs the proof of, and objections to, claims and the
41Gignoux, supra note 37, at 16.
42 See note 2 supra.
43 See note 4 supra.44 Official Forms 6 and 7.45 RULES 401 and 601.
46 RL 726-737.47
uRs 707-725.
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payment of dividends thereon. Part IV provides for the pro-
tection of the bankrupt by an automatic stay of certain actions
on unsecured debts, for preservation of his exemptions, and for
procedural protections in matters respecting objections to dis-
charge or to the dischargeability of any debt. Part IV also im-
poses on the bankrupt a duty to cooperate with the court in mat-
ters affecting the liquidation of the estate or relating to his right
to a discharge or to the dischargeability of debts. Part V is a set
of in-house rules primarily concerned with prescribing the types
of records which must be kept by the court, and providing for
the delegation of ministerial functions by the bankruptcy judge.
Part VI provides for an automatic stay of enforcement of liens
against the property of the bankrupt and spells out the procedure
to be followed in the recovery or abandonment of property by
the trustee in connection with liquidation of the estate. Part VII
specifies the procedure for commencement of adversary proceed-
ings between the trustee and the bankrupt or third parties re-
specting property of the estate, or between third parties and the
bankrupt in regard to the bankrupt's right to a discharge in
general or with respect to particular debts. Part VIII provides
the manner for perfecting appeals to the district court, while
-Part IX is a conglomeration of rules relating to the verification of
pleadings and other papers, objections to jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court, contempt proceedings, and various other matters.
Examining the highlights of Part I in more detail, it will first
be seen that this section of the rules accomplishes a change in
terminology. A bankruptcy "case" rather than a bankruptcy
"proceeding" is commenced by filing a petition. The word "pro-
ceeding" as used in the rules refers to a ". . .litigated matter
arising within a case during the course of administration of an
estate."48
Filing fees may still be paid in installments under the new
rules but they must be paid in full before the bankrupt may pay
his attorney for services in connection with the case.49 Dismissal
of a case for non-payment of the filing fees is without prejudice,
thus enabling the bankrupt to refile at a later date.50
48 RuLE 101, Advisory Committee's note.4 9 RULE 107.50RB. 120.
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A voluntary petition may be filed with the clerk if accom-
panied by a list of all the bankrupts creditors and their addresses
as long as the schedules and statement of affairs are forthcoming
within ten days thereafter."- This rule is designed to permit
expeditious filing on behalf of a bankrupt who may need to take
advantage of the automatic stay against the commencement
or continuation of suits on unsecured debts or against the enforce-
ment of liens against his property. Additional time for filing the
schedules and statement of affairs may be obtained on appropriate
application to the court.
A joint petition on behalf of a partnership and the general
partners is no longer permitted. Separate petitions must be filed
on behalf of the partnership and any of the general partners
filing for bankruptcy, although the cases may be consolidated for
purposes of administration. If only the partnership entity files
bankruptcy, the unadjudicated general partners must nevertheless
file a statement of their assets and liabilities with the trustee
of the partnership since their individual assets are subject to
liquidation for payment of partnership debts. 53
Bankrupts who inherit property within six months after bank-
ruptcy are required to file supplemental schedules describing
the property inherited. The duty to file such supplemental sched-
ules continues notwithstanding the fact the case may have been
closed. 4
In order to facilitate the liquidation of assets the concept of
venue has been expanded to permit petitions to be filed by or
against related entities in the court which first obtains jurisdiction
of one of the parties. For example, if a petition by or against a
parent corporation is pending in the district, a petition may be
filed by or against an affiliate corporation even though it may not
do business in the district, it has no property in the district, and
its principal office is located elsewhere. 5 A petition by or against
a general partner may be filed in a district where a petition by or
against the partnership is pending, even though the general part-
ner may not be a resident of the district. Likewise, a partnership
51 RULE 108(b).52 RULE 105.
3 RU=E 108(C).54 RUrt 108(e).
55 RuLE 116 a) (4).
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doing business elsewhere may be adjudged a bankrupt in the
district where a petition by or against one of the general partners
is pending.66
The right of trial by jury on the issues raised by an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy is preserved. However, the jury trial may
be conducted by the bankruptcy judge unless the bankrupt spe-
cifically demands such a trial before the district judge.57
One notable reform accomplished by the new rules eliminates
the multiplicity of signatures required of the bankrupt on the
petition and statement of affairs. Only one signature is now re-
quired for the petition, and only one for each of the schedules
and statements of affairs.15 Rule 911(c) allows the filing of
photo-copies or similarly conformed copies of the petition. Under
Rule 911(b) verification is excused for all pleadings except the
petition, schedules, and statement of affairs which must still be
verified under Rule 109.
Part II of the rules effects changes which expedite the
processing of no-asset cases. In those cases in which it appears
likely that there are no assets which can be used to pay a
dividend, the court may give the creditors notice to that effect
and inform them that they need not file claims. The notice may
advise creditors that if sufficient assets become available for the
payment of dividends the ".... court will give further notice of
the opportunity to file claims and the time allowed therefore."5
The purpose of this rule is to relieve the court of the administrative
burden of processing claims in those cases in which there is no
likelihood that the creditors will receive a dividend. In the
smaller asset cases a final meeting of creditors is dispensed with
if the net proceeds realized do not exceed $250.00.60 Also, in no-
asset cases, the court may in its discretion order that no trustee be
appointed.61
In the smaller asset cases, in order to save the expense of a
bond premium, the trustee may be excused from filing a bond
and may qualify by filing an acceptance.62 Additionally, in such
56 RULE 116(a) (3).
57 RULE 115.
58 Official Forms 1, 6 and 7.
59 Rui= 203(b).6 0 Ru. 204(c).6 1 RuLE 211.62 RuLE 212(d).
[Vol. 62
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cases the court may authorize the trustee or receiver to act as his
own attorney or accountant and award him additional com-
pensation therefor, on the theory that combining these offices in
one person may result in a savings in the cost of administration. 3
The hand of the court in controlling the activities of officers,
including the attorney for the bankrupt, involved in the ad-
ministration of the estate is strengthened by the new rules. Every
attorney for the bankrupt, whether or not he applies for com-
pensation, must file with the court on or before the first date set
for the first meeting of creditors, unless the court otherwise
directs, a statement disclosing the compensation, paid or promised,
for services rendered or to be rendered in the case, the source
of compensation, and whether the attorney has shared or agreed
to share such compensation with any other person.6 4 The dis-
closure statement provided for by this rule is designed to assist
the court in policing the requirement of Rule 107(8), which
postpones payment of attorney fees until the filing fees are
paid in full. It also enables the court to fulfill its duty to examine
any payment of money or transfer of property from the bankrupt
to his attorney which may appear to be excessive, and to order
the amount of any excess paid to the trustee for the benefit of
the estate or refunded to the bankrupt. An attorney who seeks
and is awarded compensation from the estate is precluded from
sharing the compensation with a forwarding attorney unless the
attorney sharing in the compensation has actually contributed
to the services for which the compensation is allowed. 5
An innovative provision in Part III of the rules dealing with
claims and distribution to creditors permits the bankrupt to
execute and file a proof of claim in the name of a creditor having
a provable claim for taxes or wages if the creditor fails to file his
claim on or before the first date set for the initial meeting of
creditors. The court must give notice of the filing of such a claim
to the creditor and to the trustee. Thereafter, the creditor may
file a proof of claim which supersedes the proof filed by the
bankrupt.6 This rule is designed primarily to protect the bank-
rupt against the consequence of the failure of taxing authorities
63 RULE 215(e).
(4 RuLE 219(b).
65 RuLE 219(d).66 RuLE 303.
1974]
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to timely file proofs of claim. Generally speaking, tax claims are
entitled to priority in payment out of the assets of the estate
and are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. To the extent that
the claim is paid out of the estate, the bankrupt is relieved from
payment of the claim following bankruptcy. Where nonpay-
ment of the claim out of the assets of the estate results from
the failure of the taxing authority to timely file its proof of claim,
the bankrupt suffers the consequence of this failure through no
fault of his own and will ordinarily remain obligated for payment
of the claim because tax claims are excepted from discharge in
bankruptcy.
A parallel rule permits a co-debtor with the bankrupt to file a
claim on behalf of the creditor which they jointly owe, but only
if the creditor fails to file his claim on or before the first date set
for the first meeting of creditors. The purpose of this rule is to
relieve the co-debtor of the obligation to pay the debt to the
extent that it may be paid out of the estate. However, no distribu-
tion may be made on such a claim except upon satisfactory
proof that the original debt will be diminished by the amount of
the distribution. The proof of claim filed by the co-debtor is
superseded by a claim subsequently filed by the creditor.
67
Claims must still be filed within six months after the date first
set for the first meeting of creditors, subject to the power of the
court to grant a reasonable fixed extension of time for the filing
of a claim by the United States, a state or subdivision thereof,
or on behalf of an infant or incompetent person without a
guardian. Also, in those cases in which creditors were given
notice not to file claims because a dividend appeared unlikely,
but the payment of a dividend subsequently appears possible,
creditors may file proofs of claim within sixty days after the
mailing of a notice to file claims even though the six-month period
for filing claims may have expired.6"
Rule 806 relieves the court of the burden of making orders
allowing each individual claim by providing that claims shall be
deemed allowed for the purpose of distribution unless objection
is made by a party in interest. The trustee is under a duty to
examine proofs of claim and object to the allowance of im-
67 RULE 304.
08 RuLE 302(e).
[Vol. 62
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proper claims unless no purpose would be served thereby. An
objection to the allowance of a claim must be in writing
and the creditor must be given notice of the hearing on the
objection. If a secured creditor files a proof of claim, the value
of the secured interest held by him as collateral for his claim
must be determined by the court, and the claim may be allowed
only to the extent it is enforceable for any excess of the claim
over such value. 0 In order to reduce the administrative burden
of issuing checks for minuscule amounts, the court may order that
no dividend of less than $1.00 shall be distributed by the trustee
to any creditor.7 0
The rules in Part IV do not impose any new duties71 upon
the bankrupt, but they do confer new benefits. One such benefit
is the automatic stay provided for by Rule 401. Under this rule
the filing of a petition operates as a stay of the commencement
or continuation of any action against the bankrupt founded on
unsecured provable debts, except debts for taxes, wages, bond
monies due employees, or for alimony or maintenance. The stay
remains in effect perpetually unless the bankruptcy case is dis-
missed or the bankrupt waives or otherwise loses his right to a
discharge. Provision is made for a creditor to obtain relief from
the stay by filing a complaint with the bankruptcy court and
showing cause therefor.72
Unless objected to by a creditor within the 15-day period
provided for by the rules, the trustee's report of exempt property
becomes final without the necessity of a formal order of ap-
proval by the court.73 If a bankrupt fails to claim his exemptions,
provision is made for his spouse or dependent children to
claim them in order that they may not be prejudiced by the
bankrupt's failure to make timely application for the exemptions
in the schedules to his petition.74
The rules permit the time for objecting to the discharge of
the bankrupt or to the dischargeability of a particular debt to
69 RuLE 306.
7 0 R1rE 309.
7' Under Rule 402 the bankrupt remains under a duty to attend hearings and
to cooperate with and make full disclosures to the trustee in connection with the
administration of the estate.72 RuLE 401.7 3 RuLE 403.
7 4 RutE 403(f).
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be shortened to as little as ten days if it appears there will be no
dividend to creditors. The time for filing a complaint objecting
to discharge or to the dischargeability of a debt may be fixed as
early as the first meeting of creditors, which can be set on ten
days notice.7 5 Ordinarily, however, the time for filing a com-
plaint objecting to discharge or to the dischargeability of a debt
will not be fixed at less than thirty nor more than ninety days
after the date first set for the first meeting of creditors. The
provision in Section 14c(8) of the Act which shifts the burden
of proof to the bankrupt in a trial upon objections to discharge,
if the objecting creditor makes out a prima facie case, has been
superseded. Rule 407 provides that at the trial on a complaint
objecting to the discharge, the plaintiff has the burden of proof.
If no complaint objecting to the discharge has been filed and the
bankrupt has submitted himself to examination at the first meet-
ing of creditors and has paid the filing fee, the court must grant
him a discharge.76 A new requirement imposes on the court a
duty to mail a copy of the order of discharge to all creditors.7
Additional protection is provided by a rule which permits the
discharge to be registered in the office of the clerk of any district
court of the United States and when so registered the order has
the effect of an order of the court of that district, and may be
enforced by orders issuing from that court. 8 This rule is intended
to protect the bankrupt in the event that he moves to a foreign
district and is subject to suit in that district by a creditor whose
debt was discharged in bankruptcy.
Some of the in-house rules in Part V are designed to centralize
administration in the office of the bankruptcy judge and to permit
him greater leeway in delegating ministerial functions. A petition
commencing a bankruptcy case must be filed in the office of the
clerk of the district court; however, after reference, all amend-
ments, complaints, and other types of pleadings must be filed in
the office of the bankruptcy judge 9 All papers filed in a bank-
ruptcy case, the bankruptcy judge's docket, and the list of claims,
75 RtrLEs 404 and 409.
76 RULE 404(d).77 1tuLE 404(h).78 RuLE 404(g).
79 Ruxl 509.
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if any, are public records.s0 The bankruptcy judge may delegate
most ministerial functions-for example the issuance of a sum-
mons and notice of trial-to an assistant employed in his office.8 '
The requirement of a public examination of the bankrupt is
retained . 2 A new requirement is that whenever practicable the
court must make a record, by sound recording or by a reporter,
of all proceedings in bankruptcy cases. s3
Part VI of the rules relating to the collection and liquidation
of the estate provides for an automatic stay of enforcement of liens
upon the bankrupt's property which is in the custody of the bank-
ruptcy court. The stay continues in effect until the case is dis-
missed or closed, or until the property subject to the lien is,
with approval of the court, set apart as exempt, abandoned, or
transferred. However, the court may, for cause shown, terminate,
annul, modify, or condition the stay on a complaint by a creditor
seeking relief therefrom.84
If the bankrupt owns real property the rules provide for a
filing of a certified copy of the bankruptcy petition, without the
schedules, in the office of the county court clerk to notify the
public that the debtor's property is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding. 5 With respect to personal property, the trustee is
under a duty to give notice of the bankruptcy to every person
known to be holding money or property subject to withdrawal
or order of the bankrupt, including every bank, building and
loan association, public utility company, landlord with whom
the bankrupt has a deposit, and every insurance company which
has issued a policy having a cash surrender value payable to the
bankrupt.88 However, failure to give such notice does not validate
post-bankruptcy transfers of property of the bankrupt.
A state court receiver or trustee or assignee for the benefit
of creditors who has custody of property of the debtor when
bankruptcy intervenes must promptly file a written report and
account with the bankruptcy court for the property of the estate
80 RULE 508.81 RULE 506.
s2 RULE 501(b).
8 3 RULE 511.8 4 RULE 601(c).
85 RuLE 602(a).8 6 RULB 602(b).
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and its administration. The propriety of such administration,
including the reasonableness of all disbursements made before
the intervention of bankruptcy, are subject to review by the
bankruptcy court.87
The provision that sales in bankruptcy proceedings must
be by public auction, unless otherwise ordered by the court upon
application to the court and for good cause shown, is retained,
as well as the provision for selling encumbered property free of
liens where the holder of an interest in the property can be com-
pelled to take a money satisfaction.8 8 The trustee is authorized
to abandon property of inconsequential value; he is likewise
authorized to redeem property from a lien or from a sale to
enforce a lien to preserve the equity value of the property for
the estate.89 Moreover, the trustee or receiver may, with or
without court approval, prosecute or enter an appearance and
defend any action or proceeding on behalf of the estate, before
any tribunal90 Control of disbursement of monies of the estate
has been relaxed so as to permit the trustee to withdraw funds
by check without the countersignature of the bankruptcy judge. 1
The purpose of this rule is to relieve the bankruptcy judge of
the ministerial function of countersigning checks.
The numbering of the rules in Part VII governing adversary
proceedings is correlated with the numbering of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. An adversary proceeding to recover money
or property, determine the validity of a lien, sell property free
of a lien or other interest, object to or seek revocation of a dis-
charge, obtain an injunction or relief from the automatic stay
provided in Rule 401 or 601, or determine the dischargeability
of a debt is commenced by filing a complaint with the court in
the bankruptcy case.92 The summons and notice of trial issued
by the court upon the filing of such a complaint retains the feature
of the show cause order which permits not only the time for
answer but also the date of the trial to be fixed by the summons.
The summons, complaint, and notice of trial may be served
87 RuLE 604.
8 8 RULE 606.89 RULES 608 and 609.
9 0 RULE 610.9 1 RLE 605.
92 RULES 701 and 703.
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personally upon the defendant as provided by Rule 4(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it is contemplated
that the innovative alternative method which allows service by
any form of mail requiring a signed receipt will be the principal
form of service used 3
A most important change9 4 from prior practice authorized by
the rules is the provision for nationwide service of process,
thereby eliminating any doubt as to the validity of extrater-
ritorial service of process in bankruptcy proceedings.95 The pro-
cedure for service of process by mail is as follows. The court
issues a summons and notice of trial and causes it to be delivered,
either personally or by mail, to the attorney for the complainant,
who in turn is responsible for mailing the summons, complaint,
and notice of trial by mail in a form which requires a signed
receipt within three days after issuance of the summons 86 When
the signed receipt accompanying the registered or certified letter
is returned to the attorney, he must file with the court an affidavit
of service with the receipt attached thereto as proof that service
of process was accomplished.
The 25-day period allowed for filing an answer to the com-
plaint is computed from the date of issuance of the summons
and notice of trial, as opposed to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allow 20 days from the date of service. Gen-
erally, this time frame enables the court to set a date for trial no
more than 30 days after the filing of the complaint and the
issuance of the summons. The 25-day period is, however, subject
to extension or reduction by the court for cause shown as provided
in Rule 906, and the date for trial may be advanced or postponed
accordingly.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing counterclaims
and cross-claims, third-party practice, amended and supplemental
pleadings, pretrial procedure, joinder of claims and remedies,
joinder of persons needed for a just determination, permissive
joinder of parties, interpleader, intervention, and substitution of
93 R= 704(c).94 RULE 704(f).
95 Id.96 RuL 704(e).97R uLE 704(g).
98R LE 712.
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parties are made applicable to adversary proceedings. 9 Like-
wise, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery
are incorporated into adversary bankruptcy proceedings."' Ad-
aptations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing dis-
missal of adversary proceedings, entry of and relief from defaultjudgments, summary judgments, stay of proceedings to enforce
judgments, seizure of personal property, and injunctions also
appear in the bankruptcy rules governing adversary proceed-
ings."0 1 Finally, the bankruptcy judge is required to state sep-
arately his findings of fact and conclusions of law and to enter
the judgment in the form of a separate document, as is the case
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.0 2
The manner of taking appeals is governed by Part VIJI of the
Rules. The petition for review provided for by Section 39c of
the Act has been abolished and replaced by a procedure where-
under the appellant must file a notice of appeal with the bank-
ruptcy judge within ten days after the date of the entry of thejudgment or order appealed from. The running of the time for
filing a notice of appeal is tolled as to all parties by the filing of a
timely motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment.
The time to appeal commences to run, and is computed, from
entry or an order granting or denying such a motion. The bank-
ruptcy judge may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
for a period not to exceed 20 days beyond the initial ten-day
period, provided the request for the extension is made before the
expiration of the initial period. A request for an extension of
time for filing a notice of appeal made after expiration of the ten-
day period may be granted only upon a showing of excusable
neglect. 10 3 Within ten days after filing the notice of appeal the
appellant must file with the bankruptcy judge and serve on the
appellee a designation of the contents of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing record for inclusion in the record on appeal and a statement
of the issues he intends to raise on the appeal. °4 The time for
filing briefs is fixed by Rule 808, and Rule 809 authorizes the dis-
99 RuiES 713, 714, 715, 724, and 725.1 00 RULES 726, 728, 729, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, and 737.
101 RULEs 741, 755, 756, 762, 764, and 765.
1o2 RtrLj 752 and 921(a).
10 3 RULE 802.
104 RBLE 806.
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trict judge to afford the parties an opportunity to be heard on
oral argument.
In the general provisions appearing in Part IX the "referee"
is given the new title "Bankruptcy Judge", which explains the use
of the term throughout this article.'0 5 To help insure orderly pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy court, he is empowered to summarily
punish for a contempt committed in his presence by imposing a
fine of not more than $250.00 and may similarly punish for con-
tempt committed out of the presence of the court after hearing
on notice.10 6
The bankruptcy judge is not required to preside at examina-
tions of the bankrupt other than at the first meeting of creditors.
It is contemplated that subsequent examinations of the bankrupt
and other persons concerning transactions with the bankrupt will
be by way of deposition or through use of other discovery de-
vices.107
CHAPrE XIII RuLns
For the most part, the Chapter XIII rules (those relating to
wage earner's plan cases) conform to the straight bankruptcy
rules. For example, the rules governing adversary proceedings
and appeals in Chapter XIII cases are essentially the same as
those applicable to straight bankruptcy. There are, however, some
special features of the Chapter XIII rules which should be noted.
It is permissible for a husband and wife to file one petition under
Chapter XIII; 08 whereas, a joint petition by the husband and
wife is not permitted in straight bankruptcy cases. The concept
of venue has been expanded to permit a debtor to file his petition
either in the district in which he has his principal place of em-
ployment or in the district where he has his residence or domicile. 0 9
The Chapter XIII statement of affairs has been changed so as to
elicit information for which a biographical profile as well as a
debt profile of the debtor can be drawn."0 This new information
may be pertinent for consideration by the court in making a de-
termination as to whether the plan should be confirmed.
1o5 Rurx 901(7).
106 RunE 920.
107 RutLE 205.
108 RULE 18-111.
109 RuLE 13-110.
110 Rum 13-107; Official Form 13-5.
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Under prior practice the plan could be filed as late as the first
meeting of creditors, and there was no requirement that a copy
of the plan be served upon creditors. Under the new Chapter
XIII rules the plan must accompany the petition or be filed
within ten days thereafter, or within such further time as may
be granted by the court for cause shown. Either a copy or
summary of the plan must accompany the notice of the first
meeting of creditors.'11
There are pitfalls in the new Chapter XIII rules for the unwary
secured creditor. The rules provide that a claim not properly
filed by the secured creditor on or before the date first set for
the first meeting of creditors shall not be treated as a secured
claim for purposes of voting and distribution in a Chapter XIII
case.1 2 This means that claims of secured creditors filed after
the first meeting can be paid only as unsecured claims. A ques-
tion left unanswered by the rules is whether some provision must
be made to protect the secured creditor against depreciation
of the security during the period of consumation of the plan. If
a secured creditor seasonably files a claim, the value of the
security held by him as collateral must be determined by the
court. The claim can be allowed as a secured claim only to the
extent of the value of the security as determined by the court
and must be allowed as an unsecured claim with regard to the
balance." 3 A creditor whose claim is allowed in part as a secured
and in part as an unsecured claim is entitled to accept or reject
a plan in both capacities unless the secured claim is not dealt
with by the plan, in which event he is entitled to accept or reject
only as an unsecured creditor." 4
The usual six-month period for filing claims remains ap-
plicable for creditors whose claims are treated as unsecured." 5
However, post-petition claims for taxes and for property or
services needed to assure proper performance under the plan by
the debtor are now allowable in a Chapter XIII case.""
One new feature in the Chapter XIII rules must have gone
111 R ULE 13-201.
112 RE 13-302(e) (1).
113 RULE 13-307(d).
114 RULE 13-202(c).
15 RiLE 13-302(e) (2).
116:RULE 13-305.
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unnoticed by the taxing authorities. It permits the debtor to
include in the plan a provision to the effect that creditors entitled
to priority shall be deemed to have waived such priority upon
their failure to reject the plan prior to the first meeting of
creditors.117 Delinquent and accrued taxes, otherwise entitled
to priority, could easily lose their preferred status under this rule.
If a creditor fails to file his claim on or before the date first set
for the first meeting of creditors, either the debtor or trustee may
file a proof of claim in the name of the creditor." 8 This rule
does not authorize the debtor or trustee to vote the claim; it
merely assures the creditor of a distribution under the plan. The
creditor may later file a claim which supersedes the claim filed
on his behalf by the debtor or trustee. Likewise, a person who
is a co-debtor with the debtor on an obligation for which the
creditor fails to file his proof of claim on or before the first date
set for the first meeting of creditors may file a proof of claim in
the name of the creditor. The co-debtor can even vote the claim
in behalf of the creditor. But, the rules provide that no distribu-
tion shall be made on the claim except upon satisfactory proof
that the original debt will be diminished by the amount of the
distribution. Here, too, the creditor may later file a proof of claim
which supersedes the claim filed by the co-debtor." 9
The provision in the Chapter XIII rules for automatic stay
of actions against the debtor and of the enforcement of liens
against his property is broader in scope than the automatic stay
provided for in straight bankruptcy cases. This is so because
nondischargeable debts are not excluded from the force and
effect of the automatic stay provided for in Chapter XIII cases. 20
Ordinarily, the purpose of Chapter XIII is to enable the debtor
to pay his debts in full. Consequently, the question of the dis-
chargeability of a particular debt will not often arise in the
context of a Chapter XIII proceeding. The rules, however, do
authorize any creditor to file a complaint with the court to obtain
a determination of the dischargeability of any debt. On or before
the completion of the plan by the debtor the court must make
117 RuLE 13-309(a) (3).
'IS RuLE 13-303.
110 RULE 13-304.
220 RULE 13-401.
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an order fixing the time for filing such dischargeability com-
plaints. 121
THE P oposED BANKRUPTCY Acr oF 1973
In 1970 Congress provided for the creation of the Commission
on Bankruptcy Laws for the United States.12  The congressional
charge to the Commission was to study, analyze, and evaluate
the present bankruptcy laws, and to consider the philosophy and
causes of bankruptcy, possible alternatives to the present system
of bankruptcy administration, the applicability of advanced man-
agement techniques for better efficiency in the administration of
the Act, and all other matters which the Commission might deem
relevant. 123 On July 30, 1973, the Commission filed its report
with the President, Congress, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.124 The Commission was unusual among presidential com-
missions in that it not only prepared a report of its findings but
also wrote a new bankruptcy act embodying its recommenda-
tions.12 5 The Commission bill, entitled "The Bankruptcy Act of
1973" was introduced in both houses of Congress in late 1973.126
The House and Senate judiciary committees are expected to begin
hearings on the bill sometime during the year 1974.
There appears to be little objection to the Commission's pro-
posal for the establishment of a separate and independent bank-
ruptcy court vested with jurisdiction to determine most contro-
versies arising from cases commenced under the Act.1'2 A com-
prehensive grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts over
controversies arising out of any bankruptcy or rehabilitation case
would greatly diminish the basis of litigation of jurisdictional
issues which consume so much time, both of the bankruptcy
system and of those involved in the administration of debtors'
affairs. It would foster the development of a more uniform,
cohesive body of substantive and procedural law which would
be applicable to the administration of estates under the Act. The
121 RULE 13-407.
122 Pub. L. No. 91-354 (July 24, 1970).
123 Id.
124 REPORT OF TnE COMMSSION o THE BANiuFrcy LAWS OF T=E UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter
cited as REPoRT].
22 5 REPORT, Part H.
126 See note 5 supra.
127 REPoRT, Part I, at 85.
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withdrawal from state and federal courts of the jurisdiction of
the so-called plenary proceedings, when coupled with the estab-
lishment of uniform federal standards and rules as proposed by
the Commission for adoption and application in lieu of diverse
state laws governing debtors' and creditors' rights, would elimi-
nate a major source of uncertainty and division which has long
characterized bankruptcy law. 28
The proposed new bankruptcy court with comprehensive juris-
diction has been patterned somewhat after the tax court. The
judges of the court would be appointed by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, for terms of fifteen years.
The territorial boundaries and territorial jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court would be fixed by the Judicial Conference of the
United States and would not necessarily be conterminous with
that of the present United States district or circuit courts, or with
state lines.'2 9
The Commission has sought to enhance the real and apparent
judicial independence of bankruptcy judges through the separa-
tion of administrative and judicial functions. However, the Com-
mission's recommendation to separate the bankruptcy courts
from matters involving administration by vesting administrative
functions in a newly created agency in the Executive Branch, to
be called the United States Bankruptcy Administration,' 30 has
generated considerable opposition.' 3 ' In a sense, this recom-
mendation is somewhat pass6 in that Congress has twice pre-
viously rejected similar recommendations, 132 and it seems likely
that total responsibility for the bankruptcy process will remain in
the Judicial Branch.
The Commission proposes that the President be authorized
to appoint an Administrator as the principal executive officer
for conducting the business and affairs of the Bankruptcy Ad-
ministration. The Administrator would maintain a central office
in Washington, D.C. and would establish such regional and local
offices as he deemed necessary in order to make the bankruptcy
128 Id. at 90-91.
129 Id. at 85.
130 Id. at 108.
'3' Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973; Back to the Drafting Board, 48 Am.
B _m. L.J. 45 (1974).
132 Lee, Possible Alternatives to the Present System of Bankruptcy Administra-
tion, 45 Am. BAN a. L.J. 149 (1971).
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process available to the public. He would be authorized to
appoint other officers of the administration who would serve at
his discretion and to hire employees for lesser positions under the
classified civil service system. The Administrator further would
be permitted to delegate to such officers and employees as many
of his assigned duties as he desires.133
The principal objectives underlying the proposal to create
the independent administrative agency are increased uniformity
in bankruptcy administration and the elimination of conflict
between the judicial and administrative responsibilities of the
bankruptcy judges. However, a functional analysis of the re-
sponsibilities assigned by the Commission to the proposed United
States Bankruptcy Administration suggests that this agency would
have far more conflicting responsibilities than the bankruptcy
court has under the present system. The Administrator would
be authorized, and at various times required, to serve as clerk
of the court, counsel to debtors, advisor and consultant to cred-
itors, appointer of fiduciaries, trustee, receiver, appraiser, liqui-
dator, litigant, distributing agent, court advisor, rule-maker,
regulator of fees, and judge, as well as the head of an independent
federal agency within the Executive Branch of government."3 4
Instead of separating judicial and administrative functions, the
Commission seems to have further integrated them in the hope
that a bright administrator might be able to compartmentilize
the functions of his office in such a manner as to minimize the
conflicts.
It has been suggested that the necessary efficiency and uni-
formity, both administrative and procedural, as well as the
desired reallocation of the power to appoint and the duty to
supervise trustees and receivers can be more economically and
effectively accomplished through enlargement of the administra-
tive authority and responsibilities of the Administrative Office
of United States Courts if accompanied by the segregation of the
present clerical staffs of the local bankruptcy courts from the
bankruptcy judges. This can be done, it is proposed, by sub-
ordinating these clerical staffs to the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts. Such an approach appears far superior
133 REPORT, Part I, at 117.
134 Cyr, supra note 180, at 60-67.
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to the Commission proposal because the clerks of the bankruptcy
courts would have responsibility for the performance of only ad-
ministrative and clerical duties, unlike the proposed Bankruptcy
Administration, which would be created as a veritable corporate
compendium of conflicting interests, powers, and duties.135
In addition to the chapters detailing the structure of the
proposed new bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Administra-
tion, the commission bill, in separate chapters, provides for
liquidation bankruptcies, '36 plans for debtors with regular in-
come, 1 3 7 reorganizations,:' 38 adjustment of debts of political sub-
divisions,'3 9 and railroads reorganizations.' 40 There is also a gen-
eral chapter detailing provisions generally applicable to all types
of cases.. 4'
The bill contains one significant departure from current liqui-
dation procedures by contemplating that the Administrator will
serve as trustee in most such cases.' 42 The selection of private
trustees as permitted by the present Act would be the exception
rather than the rule.
The provisions of the Commission bill for debtors with regular
income would modify present Chapter XIII in several respects.
The class of eligible petitioners would be expanded to include
individuals whose principal income is derived from retirement
benefits, welfare payments, or any other similar source, as well
as from wages, salary, or commissions.' 43 The present require-
ment that the debtor's plan be accepted by the majority, in
number and amount, of creditors affected thereby would be elimi-
nated. Under the commission proposal a plan could be confirmed
without creditor consent so long as it safeguards their interests.
The Commission has also made proposals whereby secured
creditors may be bound by the plan so long as they are protected
to the extent of the value of their collateral.' 44 Imposition of a
moratorium on collections from co-debtors for as long as the
'35 Id. at 59.
23 6 REPORT, Part II, at 183.
'37 Id. at 201.
138 Id. at 217.
'39 Id. at 263.
140Id. at 273.
14' Id. at 67.
142 Id. at 183.
14 Id. at 2, 73.144 Id. at 207.
1974]
K-TrUcKY LAw JoURNAr
debtor is performing under the plan is likewise recommended.145
Present Chapters X, XI, and XII have been combined by the
proposed act into a single chapter on reorganizations. A major
attribute of this proposal is that it would permit a plan to affect
the rights of secured creditors in all reorganization cases.'46
Under the present Act secured creditors may not be dealt with
in a plan of arrangement under Chapter XI.147 The principal
problem resulting from the proposed merger of these chapters
would be the apparent elimination of the relatively speedy re-
habilitation of business entities through use of the composition
which is presently available under Chapter XI of the Act. The
Commission proposes that the so-called absolute priority rule now
adhered to in Chapter X cases be made applicable to all reorga-
nization proceedings. 148 Under this rule, creditors of the highest
class must be paid in full before creditors in the next highest
class may receive any payment. Since trade creditors generally
occupy a higher status than that of equity security holders (stock-
holders), this would mean that trade debts would have to be paid
in full before the stockholders, or in the event of an unincorpo-
rated business the proprietor or the partners, would be per-
mitted to retain any interest in the business. Predictably, ap-
plication of this rule would result in the liquidation of most
business enterprises involved in reorganization proceedings.
The chapter providing for adjustment of debts of political
subdivisions has also been rewritten. Under the new provisions
cities, counties, water and sewer districts, and other taxing
entities that may have become over extended as a result of the
sale of obligations for public improvements would find bank-
ruptcy more accessible. 49
The Bankruptcy Administration proposal notwithstanding,
many of the aforementioned recommendations of the Commis-
sion are relatively non-controversial. The commission bill, how-
ever, may be challenged in regard to its treatment of certain
other crucial issues of substantive law. For example, its proposal
that the six-year bar to successive discharges in bankruptcy be
145 Id. at 214.
146 Id. at 236, 241-243.
147 Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970).
148 REPORT, Part II, at 241-43, 251-53.
149 Id. at 263.
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reduced to five years and that the court be empowered to grant
a subsequent discharge without regard to the five-year bar in
hardship cases, I5 is a likely target for considerable criticism.
The same holds true for the proposed abolition of the concept
of acts of bankruptcy. The Commission's plan would permit one
creditor with an unsecured claim in excess of $2,500.00 to petition
a debtor into liquidation. One creditor with a claim of $10,000.00
would be permitted to petition a debtor into reorganization. The
present bankruptcy balance sheet method of insolvency would
be discarded. Relief could be granted on a creditor's petition
on proof that the debtor generally fails to pay his debts as they
become due, which is the equity test of insolvency.151 A third
controversial provision would reduce the priority for tax claims
from three years to one year-that is, only those taxes which
accrue within one year of bankruptcy would enjoy priority.152
The Commission also proposes to use federal standards to
identify which property is to be deemed exempt and thus set
apart from the debtors who come into the bankruptcy court.5 3
The present system, under which the debtor's exemptions are
determined by reference to the law of his domicile, tends to
frustrate the constitutional mandate of uniformity in the ap-
plication of the bankruptcy laws. The proposed federal exemp-
tion law covering all types of exempt property would supersede
the state law in determination of the debtor's exemptions in
bankruptcy cases. Dollarwise, under the proposed exemption
statute the exemptions might total as much as $8,000.00 in the
ordinary consumer bankruptcy case. 54 By comparison, under
present state laws such exemptions might be considered penurious
in some states and magnanimous in others.
The fradulent financial statement would be eliminated as a
ground for an objection to the discharge of a bankrupt. Likewise,
it would be eliminated as a ground for objecting to the discharge-
ability of a consumer debt. 55 The Commission would also re-
write the law of preferences so as to reduce the present four-
,o5 Id. at 132-33.
251 Id. at 74.
152 Id. at 109-11.
153 Id. at 125-27.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 132-37.
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month shadow period for invalidating payments on antecedent
debts to three months. 15 The term "antecedent debt" has been
redefined to exclude from its meaning payments on debts for
personal services or utility bills, incurred within three months
of the petition, and to provide for other exclusions which would
dramatically reduce the number of transactions which might fall
within the definition of a preference.5 7 In addition, an attempt
has been made to solve the problem presented by the blanket
security agreement covering inventory and accounts receivable
by application of the "net result" rule. Under this rule the posi-
tion of the secured creditor three months preceding bankruptcy
would be compared to his position on the date of bankruptcy.
To the extent that his position may have improved, as a result
of an increase in inventory or accounts receivable in relation to
the amount of his outstanding debt, the net increase would be
considered preferential.'58
These and other changes proposed by the Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws involve major policy considerations and will
undoubtedly undergo careful scrutiny by Congress. Moreover, it
seems probable that other organizations such as the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and the National Bankruptcy
Conference will submit to Congress alternative proposals for
bankruptcy reform worthy of serious consideration. Speculation
as to the exact nature and content of the resulting legislation is,
therefore, hazardous and of dubious value. Still, it is highly
unlikely that the exhaustive work of the Commission will go for
naught, and few would argue with the conclusion that momentous
changes in the structure of the bankruptcy system and in the
substantive bankruptcy law are in the offing.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of the Bankruptcy Act of 1973 or some alterna-
tive thereto will be the culmination of a series of major develop-
ments which have profoundly altered the law of bankruptcy
within the span of only four years. The two achievements
'501d. at 166-68.
157 Id. at 168.
158 Id. at 166-68.
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which have figured most prominently in that process are the new
dischargeability law and the new rules of bankruptcy procedure.
Together, they have enhanced the power of bankruptcy courts to
enforce orders discharging individual debtors, more clearly de-
fined the relationships between the bankruptcy court and other
federal and state courts, simplified and generally upgraded bank-
ruptcy court procedures by bringing them more closely in line
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and provided the
impetus for and, to a large extent, the substance of, many basic
reforms in the structure of the bankruptcy system. In short, they
have made the bankruptcy system more nearly equal to the
difficult task of protecting the interests of debtors, creditors, and
the state in a fair and efficient manner.
